The bilateral allocation of aid is one of the foreign policy tools available to donor countries. It will therefore be determined to some extent by the selfinterest of the donor country as well as the recipient country's need for aid. Many donors claim that respect for human rights also plays a role in their allocation decisions (see, e.g., Tomaševski, 1997; Gillies, 1999; Neumayer, 2003a) . This article tries to assess what impact, if any, respect for human rights really has on the allocation of aid to recipient countries.
The article differs and improves upon the existing literature on two major accounts. First, there has been too much exclusive focus on U.S. aid allocation. Instead, this article examines the allocation of aid from all 21 countries that are members of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Second, I avoid the implicit bias of some of the literature that has implicitly equated human rights with political/civil rights, sometimes explicitly subsumed under the heading of democratic governance. To do so, I introduce a further variable, namely, personal integrity rights, which has been used before by a number of studies addressing U.S. aid allocation (see, This article also uses a variable measuring respect for personal integrity rights with data from the two Purdue Political Terror Scales (PTS) in accordance with some of the studies that specifically look at U.S. aid allocation. Even though there is some overlap with the concept of civil liberties from Freedom House, these scales have a much clearer focus on what arguably constitutes the very core of human rights and they are not simply redundant.
1 One of the two PTS is based on a codification of country information from Amnesty International's annual human rights reports to a scale from 1 (best) to 5 (worst). Analogously, the other scale is based on information from the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. Codification is according to rules with regard to the prevalence of political imprisonment, disappearances, torture, political murder, and other forms of politically motivated violence within a country.
The major difference between personal integrity rights and the political/ civil rights from Freedom House data lies in two things: personal integrity rights violations are without doubt nonexcusable and are not subject to the relativist challenge (see Perry, 1997 ). There simply is no justification whatsoever for political imprisonment, torture, and murder. Governments that employ or tolerate such activities are guilty of political terrorism (hence the name of the scales). Political/civil rights violations do not carry quite the same status. One cannot dismiss the argument that these rights are contingent on a particular form of Western culture and that a certain amount of political/civil rights violations are somehow ''necessary'' for the stability of certain countries and the welfare of their people as easily as one can dismiss a similar argument with respect to political imprisonment, torture, and murder (see, e.g., Moon and Dixon, 1992) . In this sense, McCann and Gibney (1996:16) are correct in arguing that the PTS refer to ''policies within the developing world which all theorists and investigators would agree constitute egregious miscarriages of political authority'' and represent ''the most serious form of human rights abuses.'' Note that the measures used in this study only capture what is sometimes called first-generation rights, but not economic and social rights, sometimes called second-generation rights. There are mainly two reasons for this exclusion. First, governments can be better held responsible for violations of first-generation rights than for economic and social rights. Respect for the latter rights can be partly or wholly outside the reach of governmental action. It is difficult to discern whether low achievement of economic and social rights is a consequence of neglect or malevolent governmental activity or simply the consequence of a country's poverty. Second, and related to this, low achievement of these rights might be reason for the receipt of more rather than less aid. The reason is the overlap with a country's need for foreign aid. Countries with low gross domestic product (GDP) per capita 1 Indeed, the partial Pearson correlation coefficient is not very high (r 5 0.21; n 5 1,262). are more in need for foreign aid, but are also less likely to satisfy economic and social rights.
Research Design

The Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is net official development assistance (ODA) a country receives as a share of total net ODA allocated in that year by the donor country. ODA data over the period 1985 to 1997 are taken from OECD (2000), which provides data for all political units in the world receiving aid, approximately 185 countries and dependent territories. Unfortunately, PTS data are unavailable for many of these, particularly the small countries and all the dependent territories. The remaining sample comprises 105 countries.
The Independent Variables
In accordance with the established literature, three kinds of independent variables are used: need, interest, and human rights variables. Also, population size is used as an explanatory variable to account for differences in the size of countries. In addition, year-specific time dummies are included to account for changes over time that affect all recipient countries equally.
The only need variable included is the natural log of GDP per capita in purchasing power parity in constant U.S.$ 1995, taken from World Bank (2000) . It is the by far most commonly and often only need variable used in the literature (see Neumayer, 2003 for an overview of this literature). This is because it has good data availability and it is highly correlated with other need variables such as life expectancy, infant mortality, or literacy. Neumayer (2003) demonstrates that these other need variables are insignificant once income is controlled for in case of most donors. Greater need should have a positive effect both on the probability of receiving aid as well as on the amount of aid allocated.
Four variables are used to capture different aspects of donor interest in line with the existing literature (see Neumayer, 2003) . The first is the number of years the recipient country has been a former colony of the donor in the 20th century (Alesina and Dollar, 2000) . It is a well-established result that many donors favor their former colonies in part at least because of a political interest in maintaining their influence on those countries. The second donor interest variable is the value of exports from the donor country (Gleditsch, 2001 ). The idea is that donors might want to promote their exports in giving more aid to countries that are major recipients of their goods and services. The third variable is the geographical distance between the donor and the recipient country's capital (Haveman, 2000) .
2 This variable can be expected to be significantly negative only for some donors that want to promote a regional sphere of influence in giving more aid to proximate countries, whereas the aid allocation of other donors has a more global orientation. The fourth variable attempts to measure a security interest of donors. Unfortunately, relevant variables are difficult to find for most donors. We take the military aid a recipient country receives as the share of total U.S. military aid as our proxy variable (USAID, 1999) . Countries that receive a higher share of U.S. military aid can be expected to be of greater importance to Western security interests.
The two human rights variables used have already been introduced and justified above. The first is the respect for personal integrity rights based on the Purdue Political Terror Scales (PTS), where the simple average of the two indices was taken. If one index was unavailable for a particular year, the other one was taken over for the aggregate index. The index was then reversed such that 1 means worst and 5 means best human rights performance.
The second variable is the combined political rights and civil liberties index from Freedom House (2000) . This is based on expert surveys assessing the extent to which a country effectively provides for political rights and civil liberties, both measured on a 1 (best) to 7 (worst) scale. A combined political/civil rights index was created by adding the two variables so that the index ranges from 2 to 14, which was then reversed and transformed to a 1 (worst) to 5 (best) scale.
Methodology
In accordance with, for example, Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) and Poe and Sirirangasi (1994) , I assume a two-year lag of the independent variables since decisionmakers are unlikely to have more recent data available at the time they allocate aid flows. This lagging of the independent variables should also reduce any potential problems of simultaneity.
Assessing the impact that respect for human rights has on the allocation of aid has to deal with the fact that not only do countries receive different amounts of aid, but some countries do not receive any aid at all from particular donors. In our sample, the share of positive observations ranges from as high as about 96 percent in the case of France to as low as around 8 percent in the case of Portugal. There are basically two options for dealing with this clustering of zero observations. One is to follow the lead of Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) and many others and to distinguish 2 Distance to Sweden functioned as a proxy for Denmark, Finland, and Norway; Spain as a proxy for Portugal; the United Kingdom as a proxy for Ireland; and Australia as a proxy for New Zealand.
between two stages in the process of aid allocation. The first stage is the socalled gate-keeping stage where it is determined which countries receive aid. The appropriate estimation technique for this kind of analysis is probit, which is used throughout.
3 The second stage is the level stage where it is determined how much aid as a share of total aid is allocated to a country that has been selected as an aid recipient in the first stage. All regressions at this stage were estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS). One of the problems with this two-stage method is that it assumes that the errors in both stages are uncorrelated. In other words, it assumes that decisions at the gate-keeping stage are taken independently from the decisions at the level stage.
The second method is Heckman's (1979) two-step estimator, which explicitly allows the error terms from both stages of aid allocation to be correlated. However, the two-step estimator works best with an exclusionary variable that has a significant impact on the first step (gate-keeping stage), but not on the second step (level stage). Otherwise, the validity of estimations depends on restrictive distributional assumptions only. The problem is that such an exclusionary variable is frequently impossible to find. Another disadvantage of Heckman's two-step estimator is that the model is highly sensitive toward model specification and estimations can be unstable. Due to these problems, the two-stage method was used for reporting the main results, but Heckman's two-step estimator was used in sensitivity analysis.
The dependent variable was logged in order to reduce the influence of outliers. All independent variables with the exception of the human rights variables were logged as well. Doing so allows an easy-to-understand elasticity interpretation of the estimated coefficient in the second-stage estimations. The human rights variables were not logged since they are not cardinal variables, with the consequence that it would be nonsensical to speak of a percentage increase with respect to human rights. The main results are not affected by whether the independent variables are logged. Since Cook-Weisberg tests rejected the hypothesis of constant variance, standard errors were used that are robust toward arbitrary heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
Grouping Donors
To guide our analysis, we distinguish three groups of donors: the big aid donors (France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), the so-called like-minded countries (Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden), and the remaining smaller donors. The big aid donors are commonly regarded as pursuing their own interest, which might leave little room for promoting human rights (Svensson, 1999) . The like-minded countries traditionally see poverty alleviation as the main objective of their aid giving. They are also commonly viewed as paying little regard to their own interest and as being committed to the pursuit of human rights in their foreign policy in general, and their aid allocation in particular (Tomaševski, 1993; Gillies, 1999; Neumayer, 2003) . The small aid donors are somewhat in between the other two groups as concerns respect for human rights: they are perhaps freer to promote respect for human rights in their aid allocation than the big aid donors, but they do not have a strong reputation of being committed to human rights as do like-minded countries.
Results Table 1 provides probit estimation results of the gate-keeping stage. The reported coefficients are not probit coefficients, which have no intuitive interpretation. Instead, they are already transformed into changes in the probability following a marginal increase at the mean of a variable, with all other independent variables held at their mean values as well. 4 Poorer countries have a higher chance of being eligible for aid receipt for all donors but Portugal. Population size has no consistent effect, but most donors, particularly the small ones, select more populous countries with higher probability. With the exception of Japan and the Netherlands, all donors give preference to their own colonies at this stage. 5 In the case of Japan, this is due to the traditionally problematic relationship between the donor and its former colonies, which were occupied during World War II. In the case of the Netherlands, it is due to a temporary withdrawal of Dutch aid to Indonesia in the mid-1990s due to anger about Indonesian politics, in particular toward East Timor. Countries that receive a higher share of U.S. military aid as well as those that import more from the donor are more likely to be eligible for the receipt of aid by most donors. Geographical distance does not exert a consistent influence at the aid eligibility stage. Only Australia, New Zealand, and Portugal have a regional bias at this stage. 6 As concerns human rights, there are few donors that give preference to countries with a good record on personal integrity rights. Indeed, in the case of Sweden, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland, countries with a poor record are actually more likely to be eligible for aid 4 Note that the probabilities are contingent on specific values of the independent variables because the probit model is nonlinear, and therefore nonadditive, in the probabilities.
5
The result ''100% success'' means that all colonies are given aid in all years. Note that due to statistical reasons, these observations need to be dropped and the estimated probabilities refer to the remaining observations only.
receipt. The situation is entirely different with respect to civil and political rights. With the exception of Germany, Australia, Austria, Ireland, and Portugal, all donors give preference to countries with a good record on such rights.
Comparing across groups of countries, no consistent pattern emerges. Most countries take recipient need as well as some aspect of donor interest into account. As concerns human rights, the like-minded countries do not stand out as a group. Denmark is the only like-minded country to give preference both to countries with greater respect for personal integrity rights and to those with greater respect for civil and political rights. The smaller donors fare no better than the big donors.
Results from the level stage are reported in Table 2 . With the exception of Luxembourg, New Zealand, and Portugal, all donors allocate a higher share of their aid to poorer countries. As expected, the income elasticity for the like-minded donor countries is quite high in absolute terms, demonstrating their commitment to poverty alleviation. 7 The majority of donors also allocate a higher share to countries with a greater population size, as one would expect. Note that the estimated elasticity for the population variable is clearly below one for all donors, which confirms the so-called population bias in aid allocation already suggested by Isenman (1976) : more populous countries receive more aid, but the aid increase is less than the proportional population increase.
With the exception of Japan and the United States, all donors give a greater percentage of aid to their former colonies. For Japan, the reason is analogous to its bias against its former colonies at the gate-keeping stage. For the United States, such a bias is highly implausible. The Philippines is the only U.S. colony in our sample with traditionally good relations with its former colonial power. If the variable ''U.S. military aid'' were not included in the model, then the colony variable would become positive. The colony variable is insignificant in our model because the effect is picked up by the ''U.S. military aid'' variable.
All big donors, with the exception of the United Kingdom, give more aid to countries that receive high shares of U.S. military aid. With the exception of Canada (a close ally of the United States), none of the like-minded countries does, which is in line with our expectations. All the big donors promote their exports in giving more aid to major importers of their goods and services. On this aspect, the like-minded countries are not free of pursuing their interest in aid giving as they also give more aid to major importing countries, with the exception of the Netherlands. The small donors vary on both these aspects of donor interest. As concerns a regional bias, our results confirm what is commonly known about certain donors: Germany, Austria, and Switzerland give some preference to eastern European and Mediterranean countries, Japan to east Asian countries, the 7 Note, however, that the income elasticity of Italy, Japan, and Finland is also very high. United States to Latin America, and, finally, Australia and New Zealand to Pacific recipient countries. The other donors do not share this regional bias. As concerns human rights, there is no consistent pattern across donors. With respect to personal integrity rights, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, and Australia provide a higher share of aid to countries with a good record. The opposite is true for Italy, the United States, the Netherlands, Norway, Luxembourg, and Spain. The variable tests insignificantly for the remaining countries. There is no systematic difference between the big aid donors, the like-minded countries, and the small donors. As concerns civil and political rights, the results paint a similarly complex picture. Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland give more aid to countries with a good record. The opposite is true for France, Australia, Austria, and Belgium, whereas civil and political rights exert no statistically significant influence on aid allocation by the remaining countries. Again, there is no systematic difference apparent across the groups of aid donors.
Sensitivity Analysis
It is sometimes suggested that the U.S. Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices are subject to some ideologically motivated bias. Poe, Carey, and Vazquez (2001) test this hypothesis and find some limited evidence that at times, particularly in the early years, the U.S. Department of State favored allies of the United States in its reports and was biased against its enemies. Replacing the variable used in the regressions reported above, which combined the PTS derived from the U.S. Department of State's and Amnesty International's reports, with the one based on the latter only leads to broadly the same results.
One might wonder whether human rights exert a greater influence in the post-Cold-War period (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) as compared to the period of the Cold War (1985) (1986) (1987) (1988) (1989) (1990) . However, this is not the case. Breaking down the sample into two subperiods did not suggest any systematically enhanced role of human rights in the post-Cold-War period. One might also be concerned about multicollinearity, given that the two aspects of human rights are correlated with each other. However, variance inflation factors were computed and were all well below 5. Also, including each of the two human rights variables in isolation leads to broadly the same result as their simultaneous inclusion. Using Heckman's two-step estimator instead of the two-stage method also hardly affects the estimation results on the human rights variables. Given that for many donors a Wald test fails to reject the hypothesis of independent equations at the two stages, this result is not very surprising as the two-stage method assumes independence of the two equations.
Concluding Observations
Existing studies that look at the role of personal integrity rights in addition to civil/political rights have focused on U.S. aid allocation. Studies looking at aid allocation by other donors have not included personal integrity rights. This article has attempted to fill this gap. Indeed, to the best of my knowledge, it is the first study to comprehensively analyze the role of human rights in the allocation of aid of all the 21 member countries of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee.
The results reported above convey a mixed picture of the role human rights play in the allocation of aid. On the one hand, respect for civil/ political rights is a statistically significant determinant of whether a country is deemed eligible for the receipt of aid for most donors. Respect for these rights thus clearly plays a role as a gatekeeper for most donors. Respect for personal integrity rights, on the other hand, is insignificant for most donors. At the level stage, respect for civil/political rights and respect for personal integrity rights exert a positive influence on the pattern of aid giving of only few donors. Alesina and Dollar (2000) , the only studies addressing the impact of civil/political rights on aid allocation by donors other than the United States. Our results with respect to the effect of civil/political rights on aid allocation are consistent with at least one of these studies in the case of France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, the Netherlands, and Norway. For Canada and Denmark, Svensson (1999) finds a positive effect of civil/political rights. Our study suggests that it is personal integrity rights instead that matter for these two donors, and that Svensson's result is due to model mis-specification, given that he does not control for these rights. A similar argument applies to Australia, for which Alesina and Dollar (2000) report a positive effect of civil/political rights, whereas our results suggest again that it is personal integrity rights that matter. Only in the case of Sweden does our study fail to find any positive effect of human rights on aid allocation contrary to Svensson's (1999) result. As concerns the United States, our results confirm Poe and Sirirangsi's (1994) finding that human rights matter at the aid eligibility stage and not at the level stage, as suggested by Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) .
One of the major results of this article is that the like-minded countries do not fare better as a group than the other donors in spite of usually being portrayed (not the least by themselves) as committed to the pursuit of human rights. This does stand in contrast to Svensson (1999) and Alesina and Dollar (2000) . What this article has shown is that the impact of human rights on aid allocation by these countries is much less consistent than the other studies would suggest. The Netherlands and Norway indeed provide more aid to countries with higher respect for civil/political rights, but also less aid to countries with higher respect for personal integrity rights. Canada and Denmark provide more aid to countries with higher respect for personal integrity rights, but not civil/political rights. Indeed, there are only two countries (Japan and the United Kingdom) that give more aid to countries with greater respect for both aspects of human rights, and they belong to the group of big aid donors, not like-minded countries.
All in all, the results reported in this study are rather sobering from a normative point of view. Respect for human rights does not exert a consistent influence on aid allocation by most donors. There is inconsistency across the two stages of aid giving as well as across the different aspects of human rights. There is not a single donor that would consistently screen out countries with low respect for civil/political and personal integrity rights and would give more aid to countries with higher respect for both aspects of human rights. If donors want to appear less hypocritical about their commitment to the pursuit of human rights, our analysis suggests that they still have a long way to go.
